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NOTE
WHO SHOULD HAVE IT BOTH WAYS?: THE ROLE
OF MITIGATING MEASURES IN AN ADA ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
Great confusion has arisen in the federal court system
over what role mitigating measures1 should play in determin-
ing whether an individual has a disability which qualifies for
the protection of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA). 2 Much of this confusion stems from the duplicitous
arguments made by both parties in cases involving mitigating
measures. A typical plaintiff/employee will first assert that she
qualifies under the ADA as an individual with a disability
because she has an impairment which, if left uncorrected,
would substantially limit one or more of her major life activi-
ties. This same employee then asserts that she is qualified for
the job she seeks because mitigating measures correct her
impairment and allow her to function without restriction.
Defendant employers use the same type of circular reason-
ing to advance their position. A defendant/employer will assert
that the plaintifflemployee does not qualify for the protection of
the ADA because her impairment is corrected by mitigating
measures and thus does not substantially limit any of her
major life activities. In the next breath, however, this employ-
er cites the employee's impairment and inability to fulfill the
job requirements as a legal justification for not hiring or
retaining her.
1 Mitigating measures include medicines, assistive devices, or prosthetics. 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
2 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-13 (1994).
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This Note examines the complex issue of mitigating mea-
sures and offers a possible solution to the inconsistent rulings
it fosters. Part I provides a short history of the ADA (with a
special focus on Title I of the Act) and a brief explanation of its
administrative procedures. Part II presents a summary of the
most prevalent arguments made on both sides of the issue,
formulated from an analysis of leading federal circuit court
cases. Part III suggests that unless or until Congress or the
Supreme Court clarifies the issue,3 the severity of an
individual's untreated impairment should be part of the ADA's
"substantially limits" evaluation. However, since the effect of
mitigating measures is only one factor that may influence a
"substantially limits" evaluation, the weight of its importance
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. The Note concludes
that this approach effectively integrates the actual language of
the statute with its agency interpretation, creating an equita-
ble approach to the law in this area.
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998), was heralded in the main stream
media as "hav[ingl a[ ] ... far-reaching effect," Joan Biskupic & Amy Goldstein,
Disability Law Covers HIV, Justices Hold, WASH. POST, June 26, 1998, at A01,
because the respondent's asymptomatic HIV was found to be a substantially limit-
ing disability. However, the Supreme Court decision did not attempt to settle the
question of what role mitigation measures should play when evaluating the severi-
ty of a person's disability. Although Justice Kennedy's opinion did hold that the
respondent has a physical disability which substantially limits a major life activity,
the Court specifically declined to address the issue of whether "the substantiality
of a limitation [should] be assessed without regard to available mitigating mea-
sures." 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
In her concurrence, Justice Ginsburg alluded to her position on the issue of
mitigating measures when she stated "[n]o rational legislator ... would require
nondiscrimination once symptoms become visible but permit discrimination when
the disease, though present, is not yet visible." Id. at 2213-14. On the other hand,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part, took the position that an individual's
disability must actually limit a major life activity, not have the potential to do so.
Id. at 2216 ("[The ADA's definition of a disability is met only if the alleged im-
pairment substantially 'limits' (present tense) a major life activity.") (citation omit-
ted).
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. The ADA in General
The Americans with Disabilities Act provides broad anti-
discrimination protection for qualified individuals with disabili-
ties by ensuring their rights of equal access and equal opportu-
nity. Congress hoped to establish "clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards" regarding discrimination to be adminis-
tered nationally, in large part by the federal government.4 To
accomplish these goals, the ADA was organized into five dis-
crete titles. Title I addresses all aspects of employment.5 Title
II regulates state and local government services and public
transportation.' Title III deals with public accommodations
and services operated by private entities.7 Title IV addresses
telecommunications.' Title V contains miscellaneous provi-
sions including laws regulating the construction of buildings,
attorney's fees, congressional compliance and removal of state
immunity.' Each title designates an executive agency to pro-
mulgate regulations and interpretive guidance. Taken together,.
these five titles provide a sweeping and complex body of law
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabil-
ities.1"
The ADA was not intended to replace or supersede other
federal anti-discrimination laws, such as the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973." Instead, the ADA broadened the scope of federal
anti-discrimination law to cover people with disabilities. The
Rehabilitation Act continues to prohibit federal government
agencies and private organizations which receive federal fund-
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1-3).
'See id. §§ 12101-17.
6 See id. §§ 12131-50.
See id. §§ 12181-89.
8 See 47 U.S.C. § 225(c) (1994).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-13 (1994).
10 "Disability" is defined in the ADA as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; a
record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment."
Id. § 12102(2)(A-C).
11 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-94 (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1994) (The
Fair Housing Amendments Act made it illegal to discriminate against persons with
disabilities in renting or buying housing and mandates reasonable accommodations
be made to ensure persons with disabilities may obtain housing).
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ing from discriminating against qualified individuals with
handicaps.12 Title I of the ADA expands the protections pro-
vided by the Rehabilitation Act into the private sector,13 state
and local governmental agencies, 4 and the Senate."
Title I also adopted the Rehabilitation Act's definition of
"physical or mental impairment" 6 and provided for consistent
enforcement standards among the agencies responsible for
enacting the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA." Additionally,
the format of Title rs implementation regulations was modeled
after Rehabilitation Act regulations, and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based its Title I regu-
lations on case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act. 8 Con-
12 The Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-69 (1994), uses the term "handicap"
instead of disability; however, the interpretive guidance to Title I of the ADA
makes it clear that
[s]ubstantively, these terms are equivalent. As noted by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, [tihe use of the term 'disabilities' instead of the
term 'handicaps' reflects the desire of the Committee to use the most
current terminology. It reflects the preference of persons with disabilities
to use the term rather than 'handicapped' as use in previous laws ....
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.1(a) (1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. III, at 26
(1990)). Today, the term "disability" and its derivatives are used in both ADA and
Rehabilitation Act cases.
Sections 501 and 503 of the Rehabilitation Act regulate hiring, placement and
advancement opportunities for qualified individuals. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(b), 793.
Section 504 mandates that organizations receiving federal funds provide disabled
individuals with opportunities to participate in federal programs and activities on
an equal basis with non-disabled persons. See id. §794.
1" See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994) (defining an entity subject to the statute
as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more em-
ployees.").
14 See id. § 12131 (1994).
15 See id. § 12209 (1994).
16 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998). The Rehabilitation Act defines "physical or
mental impairment" as
any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or ana-
tomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neuro-
logical; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular; reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary;
hemic and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or any mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.
34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(i) (1998).
17 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(b) (1994) ("The [Equal Employment Opportunity] Com-
mission, the Attorney General, and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Pro-
grams shall establish [ I coordinating mechanisms . . . in regulations implementing
this subchapter and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 . . ").
'8 See 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL
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gress amended the Rehabilitation Act in 1992 to reflect its
unity with the ADA, 9 and courts have continued to honor this
continuity by considering precedent decided under one law
binding upon similar issues brought under the other.2 °
B. Title 121
Title I of the ADA regulates all aspects of employment
"including the application process, hiring, advancement, bene-
fits, and discharge."22 It is the most heavily litigated section
of the ADA.' To achieve its goal of "remov[ing] barriers which
prevent qualified individuals with disabilities from enjoying
the same employment opportunities that are available to per-
sons without disabilities,"' Title I necessitates a case-by-case
analysis.' Each employee's disability claim must be evaluated
§7:9 (Thomas R. Trenkner ed., Lawyers Coop. Pub. 1992).
" See 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (1994) (amending 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973)) ("The stan-
dards used to determine whether this section has been violated in a complaint
alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards ap-
plied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 . . . ."); 29
U.S.C. § 794(a) (amending U.S.C. § 794 (1973)) (substituting "a disability" for
"handicaps" and "disability" for "handicap").
20 See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2202-05 (1998); Chandler v.
City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1391 & nn.18-22 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the simi-
larities between the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and applying the EEOC's
interpretation of the ADA to a case brought under the Rehabilitation Act);
Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 91 n.4 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Taylor v.
Dover Elevator Sys., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 455, 460 n.1 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (jI]t was
Congress' intent that the case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act be gen-
erally applicable to the term disability under the ADA. (citation omitted) This
decision is based upon case law from both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.").
21 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-17 (1994).
' John Parry, Overview of Key Federal Disability Legislation, in REGULATION,
LITIGATION AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACTm. A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO IMPLEMENTATION 3 (John Parry ed. 1996) [here-
inafter REGULATION UNDER THE ADA].
' See Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement & Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILITIES
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 19 (2d ed. 1997) ("The [EEOC], the
federal agency responsible for administratively enforcing Title I's employment pro-
visions, reports over 68,200 ADA complaints filed, with over 52,400 resolutions
through the administrative enforcement process recovering nearly $105 million for
affected individuals.") [hereinafter MENTAL DISABILITIES].
24 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630, Background (1998).
See id.; see also Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2214 ("It is important to note that
whether respondent has a disability covered by the ADA is an individualized in-
quiry.") (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Homeyer v.
Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that "a
1998]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
and decided in light of the specific functions of the job the
employee holds or seeks.26 Although the ADA delineates ba-
sic parameters of law and supplies a common terminology to be
used when discussing disabilities, the ADA's applicability to a
discrete situation can be determined only after examining the
unique facts of an individual case."
The ADA, like the Rehabilitation Act, defines "disability"
in three ways: "a physical or mental impairment that substan-
tially limits one or more of the major life activities of [an]
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded
as having such an impairment."8 The first definition of dis-
ability covers actual disabilities, while the second and third
"include stereotypes, stigmas, and perceptions that cause peo-
ple to be treated as if they have a covered disability."29 Within
the definition of an actual disability,0 a physical or mental
impairment is described as any physiological disorder which
"affect[s] one or more of the following body systems: neurologi-
cal, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (includ-
ing speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.""
Mental and psychological disorders, including emotional and
mental illnesses, some learning disabilities and mental retar-
dation, are also encompassed within the purview of the Act.32
determination of disability must be made on an individualized, case-by-case basis);
Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Ennis v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1995) (sum-
marizing case holdings which found that disability status must be made on a case-
by-case basis); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 207 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) ("[P]laintiffs argument . . . is precisely the message conveyed in the EEOC
regulations: that each disability determination must be made on a case-by-case
basis.").
26 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630, Background.
27 See id.
28 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A-C) (1994).
29 John Parry, The Meaning of Disability Under the ADA, in REGULATION UN-
DER THE ADA, supra note 22, at 9.
" Since this Note focuses solely on the issue of the effect mitigating measures
have on an actual disability, only the first part of the ADA's disability definition
will be examined. For further explanation of what having a record of or being re-
garded as having a disability means see 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2 (k-l) (1998).
31 Id. § 1630.2(h)(1).
22 See id. § 1630.2(h)(2). The following are specifically excluded from the
ADA's definition of a disability: any condition stemming from the current illegal
use of drugs and/or alcohol (although disabilities arising from past use of drugs
[Vol. 64: 31128
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Although the ADA's definition of a physical or mental disabili-
ty appears to include an extraordinarily large group of peo-
ple,3" its requirement that a disability "substantially limit a
major life activity" greatly restricts the actual coverage of the
ADA. Major life activities include "caring for oneself, perform-
ing manual tasks, walking, seeing; hearing, speaking, breath-
ing, learning, and working"34 but may also include sleeping,
reading, thinking, concentrating, and interacting with oth-
ers.35 To be substantially limiting, a disability must cause an
individual to be "unable to perform a major life activity that
the average person in the general population can perform" or
must "significantly restrictl" performance of that major life
activity.36 The extent to which a disability restricts a major
life activity is to be determined by examining the "nature and
severity," "duration or expected duration," and "permanent or
long-term impact" of the individual's impairment."
If an individual seeking the protection of Title I of the
ADA is found to have a physical or mental disability that sub-
stantially limits a major life activity, that individual must still
prove that s/he is qualified for the position of employment held
or desired." A qualified individual with a disability is one
"who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education, and
other job-related requirements of the ... position."39 The dis-
abled individual must prove that s/he is able to perform the
essential functions of the job with or without reasonable ac-
commodations.4" By ensuring that the disabled applicant
and/or alcohol are protected), 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a-b) (1994); homosexuality, bisexu-
ality, transvestism, and all other sexual behavior disorders not resulting from a
physical impairment, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(d)(1), (e) (1998); and compulsive gambling,
kleptomania, and pyromania. Id. § 1630.3(d)(2).
See text accompanying supra note 28-32.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i).
See EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMN, ADA ENFORCEMENT GUID-
ANCE: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 5 (Mar.
25, 1997).
36 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i-ii).
37 Id. § 1630.2(j)(2)(i-iii).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) ("No covered entity shall discriminate
against a qualified individual with a disability .... ") (emphasis added).
39 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
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has the qualifications necessary to perform the job, employers
are protected from being legally required to hire incompetent
employees.
The requirement that disabled individuals be qualified for
the position of employment they seek is juxtaposed with the re-
quirement that employers provide "reasonable accommoda-
tions" for qualified individuals with known disabilities.4' Title
I requires an employer to modify certain employment practic-
es-such as the job application process, the work environment,
or how a job is performed-if the modification would help a
qualified individual with a disability overcome her particular
impediment and perform the essential functions of the posi-
tion. These reasonable accommodations are only required,
however, when such modification will not cause the employer
"undue hardship."42 Undue hardship is generally defined as
"significant difficulty or expense in, or resulting from, the pro-
visions of the accommodation," taking into account the "finan-
cial realities" of the particular employer and other similar fac-
tors.43 Here again, the ADA requires a case-specific evaluation
to be made regarding job modifications to ensure the accommo-
dation is "tailored to match the needs of the disabled individu-
al with the needs of the job's essential functions."'
C. Administrative Procedures for Enforcing Title I of the ADA
In section 12117(a) of Title I of the ADA, Congress adopted
the administrative mechanisms and remedies of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for enforcement of the employment
provisions of the ADA.45 The most important of these inherit-
ed mechanisms is the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission. The EEOC issues regulations, offers interpretive guid-
ance on the implementation of Title I and provides adminis-
trative remedies for ADA violations.
1 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o).
42 Id.
' 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p) (1998).
14 Id. in Background.
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1994) ("The powers, remedies, and procedures set
forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall
be the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides . . ").
[Vol. 64: 3
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Before a complainant can file a state or federal lawsuit
claiming a violation of the ADA, the complainant must file a
formal charge with the EEOC within 180 days from the alleged
discriminatory behavior.46 The EEOC then investigates the
charges and, if reasonable cause is found, attempts to resolve
the matter through negotiation or mediation.' If the EEOC is
unable to resolve the issue through mediation, it may choose to
file suit against allegedly non-compliant private employers.
Cases against governmental entities are referred by the EEOC
to the Attorney General.49 The EEOC, the Department of La-
bor and the Department of Justice coordinate the filing of com-
plaints under Title I of the ADA and sections 503 and 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act in order to avoid inconsistent resolu-
tions.50
"If the EEOC has found reasonable cause to believe that
the ADA has been violated.., and has decided not to bring a
civil action "5 a complainant may choose to file an individual
civil suit against an employer for allegedly violating Title I.
Before filing, the complainant must receive a "right-to-sue
letter" from the EEOC, which is issued "180 days after a
charge is filed, or sooner if administrative review is likely to
take more than 180 days."52 A complainant may request, in
writing, that a right-to-sue letter be issued only after the expi-
ration of 180 days from the date the charges were filed with
the EEOC.53 Once a right-to-sue letter is issued and the com-
plainant has exhausted all available administrative reme-
dies,54 a complainant has ninety days to file a civil suit under
" See id.
See Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, supra note 23, at 20.
48 See id.
" See id.
50 See supra text accompanying notes 11-20; see also Kristi Bleyer Johnson,
Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILITIES, supra note 23, at 20.
51 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra
note 18, § 7:181.
2 Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILITIES,
supra note 23, at 20.
13 See 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
supra note 18, § 7:183.
" See Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, supra note 23, at 20; see, e.g., Sherman v. Optical Imaging Sys., Inc., 843 F.
Supp. 1168 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (dismissing plaintiffs claim for failing to exhaust
1998]
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Title L" Both legal and equitable remedies are available to a
plaintiff filing suit under Title I of the ADA.56 The aggregate
amount of compensatory and punitive damages which can be
awarded to a plaintiff is capped according to the total number
of employees in the company.5" These monetary damages may
be awarded in addition to back pay and legal fees. 8 Before
seeking legal remedy, however, a plaintiff suing under Title I
of the ADA must have exhausted all administrative remedies,
unless the alleged discrimination involves the local, state, or
federal government.59
II. THE QUANDARY OF MITIGATING MEASURES
In March 1997, the focus of the mainstream media and the
legal community alike centered on the question of what weight
mitigating measures should be given when evaluating how
substantially limited an individual with a disability is.6" That
administrative remedies). But see, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container,
Inc., 844 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Va. 1994) (allowing plaintiff to proceed with lawsuit
without exhausting administrative remedies when EEOC thrice refused to file the
charges.); Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, supra note 23, at 21 ("There is no requirement to exhaust administrative
remedies if the alleged discrimination involves local, state, or federal government
entities.").
5n See 2 AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: PRACTICE AND COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
supra note 18, § 7:182.
" See Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, supra note 23, at 20.
57 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994) (employers with 15-100 employees =
$50,000; 101-200 = $100,000; 201-500 = $200,000; more than 500 = $300,000).
" See id. § 1981a(b)(1-2); see also Elizabeth Gleick, Mental Adjustment: How
Far Should Employers Go to Help Someone with a Psychiatric Illness Stay on the
Job?, TIME, May 19, 1997, at 62.
" See Kristi Bleyer Johnson, Enforcement and Remedies, in MENTAL DISABILI-
TIES, supra note 23, at 21.
60 For examples of stories in the general media see Stephen Kopfinger, New
Workplace Guidelines on Disability Cause Confusion, LANCASTER NEW ERA, July 6,
1997, at Dl, available in 1997 WL 4308054; Julie Kosterlitz, Psyched Out, NATL
J., May 24, 1997, available in 1997 'WL 7228505; Richard E. Vatz, Muddled Con-
cepts of Mental Disability, WASH. TIMES (D.C.), May 21, 1997, at A12, available in
1997 WL 3672602; R.A. Zaldivar, Business Employers get Hints on Helping Mental-
ly Ill, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, May 4, 1997, at G01, available in 1997 WL 4170048.
For examples of stories in the legal media see Peter David Blanck, Attitudes, Be-
havior and the Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Who
is an Individual with a Disability?, 42 VILL. L. REV. 345, 407 n.128 (1997); Dana
D. Deane, ADA, FMLA, Workers' Compensation and Their Interplay, 572 PLI/LIT
1132 [Vol. 64: 3
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month, the EEOC issued new enforcement guidance addressing
the ADA and individuals with psychiatric disabilities.61 Per-
haps the most controversial section of this guidance provides:
"The ADA legislative history unequivocally states that the
extent to which an impairment limits performance of a major
life activity is assessed without regard to mitigating measures,
including medications." 2 In a footnote, the agency cited with
approval cases where courts determined a person's eligibility
under the ADA by evaluating the severity of an unmedicated
disability." The EEOC continued, making its position on this
issue clear: "Cases in which the courts have found that indi-
viduals are not substantially limited after considering the
positive effects of medication are, in the Commission's view,
incorrectly decided."' The impact of this statement, both on
employees with psychiatric disabilities controlled by medica-
tion and their employers, opened up a nationwide debate about
the proper interpretation of the ADA.' This debate was re-
cently resurrected in the media coverage of Bragdon v.
Abbott66---the Supreme Court decision holding that a woman
infected with HIV but currently asymptomatic was entitled to
the protection of Title III of the ADA. Although this case was
heralded by some as deciding the issue of mitigating mea-
sures,6 7 uncertainty persists since the Court specifically de-
clined to address the general issue of whether a disability
should be evaluated in its treated or untreated state."
331, 353 (1997); Bettina B. Plevan, The Year in Review: Significant Developments
in Employment Law, 571 PLI/LIT 63, 76-79 (1997).
6' See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ADA ENFORCEMENT GuID-
ANCE: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES (Mar. 25,
1997).
62 Id. at 6-7.
' See id. at 7 n.22.
64 Id.
"' See, e.g., supra note 60.
6 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); see also supra note 3.
See Joan Biskupic, U.S. Asks High Court to Rule AIDS Virus a Disability,
WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1998, at A06; Chris Black, Disability Act Covers H1V Patient,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 26, 1998, at A18; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Consid-
ers if Disabilities Act Covers H.I.V. Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1998, at A19; Lin-
da Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weaves Legal Principles From a Tangle of Litiga-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A20.
68 See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2206.
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A. EEOC Interpretive Guidance Addressing Mitigating
Measures
Two sections of the EEOC's interpretive guidance on Title
I of the ADA directly address the issue of mitigating measures.
The first reference is found in the section interpreting the term
"physical or mental impairment."69 There, the EEOC states,
"[the existence of an impairment is to be determined without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive
or prosthetic devices."" This charge-to decide if an impair-
ment exists without considering the effect of corrective mea-
sures-has not been extensively challenged in court because the
question of whether or not the plaintiff has a qualifying im-
pairment is usually not in dispute.71 Where disagreements do
frequently arise, however, is over whether mitigating measures
should be taken into account when determining if the impair-
ment substantially limits any major life activity.72
Section 1630.2(j) of the EEOC's Title I interpretive guid-
ance states that a "substantially limits" determination is to be
made "on a case-by-case basis, without regard to mitigating
measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devic-
es."73 In addition, this section offers two examples of how an
impairment can be substantially limiting, even if corrective
measures ameliorate its effect.74 The guidance states that an
individual who is unable to walk without a prosthetic device is
substantially limited in the major life activity of walking, just
as an individual with diabetes, who would lapse into a coma
without insulin, is substantially limited in all major life activi-
ties.75 In their agency decisions and other guidance materials,
the EEOC has consistently supported this statutory interpre-
" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998).
70 Id. (citations omitted).
' See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1997); Har-
ris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 519-20 (11th Cir. 1996). But see
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (parties disputed
whether plaintiffs' nearsightedness was an impairment under the ADA).
72 See infra notes 78-80.
73 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (citations omitted).
" See id.
71 See id.
[Vol. 64: 31134
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tation of what it means to be substantially limited.76 In the
federal court system, however, "substantially limits" has be-
come one of the ADA's most controversial phrases. 7
B. Case Law Addressing Mitigating Measures
The federal courts have faced the issue of corrective mea-
sures primarily in conjunction with three specific impair-
ments-diabetes, mental illness and impaired vision."h Less
frequently, the issue has been raised in cases involving other
impairments, such as kidney and thyroid disease, hyperten-
sion, asthma and breast cancer.79 When mitigating measures
are crucial to determining who the ADA protects and who it
does not, the federal courts are split. Although many circuit
courts of appeals have ruled in agreement with the EEOC's
guidance on this issue, a few circuit courts disagree with the
EEOC or have not yet decided this question." District courts,
76 See, e.g., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, ADA ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES 6-7
(Mar. 25, 1997); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, EEOC DEFINITION OF
TERM "DISABILITY," (Mar. 14, 1995) ("The investigator also should remember that
the 'disability' determination is to be made without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures.").
" See infra notes 78-80.
78 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Line, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (de-
nied protection of ADA to plaintiffs with correctable vision impairment); Sherback
v. Wright Automotive Group, 987 F. Supp. 433 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (extended protec-
tion of ADA to plaintiff with post-traumatic stress disorder); Wilson v. Pennsylva-
nia State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (extended protection of
ADA to plaintiff with correctable vision impairment); Krocka v. Reigler, 958 F.
Supp. 1333 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (extended protection of ADA to plaintiff with a dysthy-
mic disorder caused by depression and treated with Prozac); Moore v. City of
Overland Park, 950 F. Supp. 1081 (D. Kan. 1996) (denied protection of the ADA to
insulin-dependent diabetic); Cannon v. Clark, 883 F. Supp. 718 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(extended protection of the ADA to insulin-dependent diabetic); Mackie v. Runyon,
804 F. Supp. 1508 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (denied protection of Rehabilitation Act to
plaintiff with bipolar disorder treated with Lithium).
"' See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996) (ex-
tended protection of the ADA to plaintiff with Graves' disease, as thyroid disor-
der); Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996) (denied protection
of ADA to plaintiff with breast cancer); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1991) (extended protection of Rehabilitation Act to plaintiff with polycystic kidney
disorder); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (ex-
tended protection of ADA to plaintiff with severe asthma); Hodgens v. General
Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102 (D.R.I. 1997) (denied protection of ADA to
plaintiff with hypertension and arrhythmia).
0 The First, Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have
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as well as a few circuit courts, are finding themselves bound by
precedent they do not fully agree with and are, therefore, seek-
ing ways to limit or distinguish prior case law which followed
the EEOC guidance.8 Because of this fracturing, any court's
ruling on mitigating measures is unclear at best.
The recent Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Gilday v. Mecosta County82 illustrates the divergent judicial
opinions raised by the issue of mitigating measures. Kevin
decided cases in support of the EEOC's guidance, refusing to take mitigating mea-
sures into consideration when evaluating an individual's level of impairment. See,
e.g., Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998); Bartlett
v. New York State Bd. of Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Matczak v.
Frankford Candy and Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1997); Doane v.
City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, 87 F.3d
362 (9th Cir. 1996); Harris, 102 F.3d at 516; Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57
F.3d 1446, 1454 (7th Cir. 1995); Gilbert v. Frank, 949 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1991). On
the other hand, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits seem unwilling to adhere to the
EEOC's interpretation. See Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir.
1997); Sutton, 130 F.3d at 893. The Fifth Circuit recently narrowed the factual
setting in which it will apply the EEOC guidance. Washington v. HCA Health
Serv. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998). This is a departure from an
earlier Fifth Circuit decision in which the court "expressed skepticism over wheth-
er Congress really intended that [the court] consider an individual without regard
to mitigating measures." Id at 469 n.5 (citing Ellison, 85 F.3d at 191-92 n.3).
The Fourth Circuit has not had occasion to decide this issue. Search of
WESTLAW Database CTA4 (Feb. 23, 1999).
81 A recent example of this limiting can be found in Smith v. Horton Indus.,
Inc. 17 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D.S.D. 1998). Although that court found itself bound by
Eighth Circuit precedent following EEOC guidance regarding mitigating measures,
the Smith court writes:
Were this court "writing on a clean slate," the Court would adopt the
rationale of the Tenth Circuit in Sutton [which took mitigating measures
into account when evaluating the extent of the plaintiffs impairment]. By
way of personal example, I cannot read at all, hunt successfully or play
tennis successfully without the use of eye wear. It would seem to be
unfair, if you will, to conclude that uncorrected vision due to the aging
process would translate to a disability within the meaning of the ADA.
Id. at 1099.
The Fifth Circuit also recently held that although the EEOC's directive on
mitigating measures should be followed, it should only be applied to "serious im-
pairments." Washington, 152 F.3d at 470 ("Although we think it is more reason-
able to say that mitigating measures must be taken into account, we recognize
that our position is not so much more reasonable to warrant overruling the EEOC.
Thus, we will follow the EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history, but we read
them narrowly.") (footnote omitted); id. at 469 ("[W~e think that these cases, which
have held that mitigating measures must be taken into account, offer the most
reasonable reading of the ADA.").
82 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Gilday worked as an emergency medical technician in Mecosta
County, Michigan for sixteen years." Gilday was diagnosed
with non-insulin dependent diabetes in September of 1991.m
He treated this condition through a combination of oral medi-
cation, a strict diet and regular exercise.85 When unable to
maintain this treatment regime or when subjected to prolonged
stress, Gilday's blood sugar levels would fluctuate wildly, caus-
ing him to become easily frustrated, short-tempered and irrita-
ble.86 In August of 1994, Gilday was fired "for conduct unbe-
coming a paramedic and a history of rudeness to patients and
colleagues.8 7
Upon his termination, Gilday filed suit under the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act in the District Court for the Western
District of Michigan against his former employer, Mecosta
County, claiming his diabetes qualified as a disability.8 He
alleged that Mecosta's refusal to transfer him to a less chaotic
paramedic station violated the ADA's requirement that em-
ployers reasonably accommodate disabled employees. 9 He
further claimed this lack of accommodation increased his stress
level, which caused his rude conduct and eventually led to his
termination.' ° Although both parties agreed that Gilday's dia-
betes qualified as a physical impairment under the ADA,9
the district court granted Mecosta County's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that this physical impairment
did not substantially limit any of Gilday's major life activi-
ties.92 He did not, therefore, qualify for the protection of the
ADA, and his termination was upheld. 3
In a unanimous decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed the
summary judgment, finding that Gilday did present evidence
which could prove he was a qualified individual with a disabili-
8' See id. at 761 (citation omitted).
64 See id.
85 See id. (citation omitted).
8 See id. (citation omitted).
87 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 761 (citation omitted).
68 See id.
89 See id.
" See id.
9 See id. at 762 (citations omitted).
92 See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 761 (citation omitted).
" See id.
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ty.94 What the panel of three judges could not agree on, how-
ever, was whether or not the severity of Gilday's condition
should be evaluated in light of the ameliorative effect his cor-
rective regime had on his diabetes.95 Each judge set forth his
or her own unique answer to the question of"[w]hether [or not]
the Court [sihould [take the [piresence of [mlitigating
[mieasures into [a]ccount [w]hen [dieciding [wihether a [d]is-
ability [e]xists."96
Judge Karen Moore's opinion fully embraced the EEOC's
interpretive guidance on the issue. 7 She found the EEOC's
mandate to examine an individual's impairment without re-
gard to mitigating measures consistent with the statutory
language of the ADA, its purpose and its legislative history.8
In her opinion, Judge Cornelia Kennedy asserted that
EEOC guidance is not binding law, but only an executive
agency's interpretation of binding law.' Judge Kennedy rea-
soned that the EEOC's guidance on this issue should be ig-
nored because it conflicts with the plain, unambiguous lan-
guage of the ADA itself.00 Judge Kennedy further warned
that if the EEOC's advice is given the force of law and mitigat-
ing measures ignored, ADA protection will extend to a class of
people Congress did not intend to protect, that is, to "all indi-
viduals whose life activities would hypothetically be substan-
tially limited were they to stop taking medication." 1
Finally, Judge Ralph Guy took a centrist position on the
issue of mitigating measures. Not willing to give full effect to
the EEOC guidance and also not willing to totally ignore an
individual's condition when an impairment is treated, Judge
Guy advanced an approach that determines on a case-by-case
basis the influence mitigating measures should have in a "sub-
" See id.
Judge Moore found that Gilday presented evidence of material questions of
fact as to whether he is a qualified person with a disability after evaluating his
untreated condition. Id. at 762-66. J. Kennedy and J. Guy, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, found material issues of fact as to the substantial limitations of
Gilday's impairment even in his treated state. Id. at 766-68.
" Id. at 762.
17 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (1998).
's See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763-65.
See id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
'0' See id. at 766-67.
10 Id. at 767.
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stantially limits" evaluation." 2 If a particular plaintiff is
"completely functional" due to the positive effects of corrective
measures, that individual's disability "should be evaluated as
such.""' However, if an individual is assisted by mitigating
measures and still qualifies as disabled under the ADA, that
person should receive the protection of the statute.0 4 This
single case encapsulates the divergent legal approaches taken
in an attempt to solve the problem of mitigating measures.
Due to the unsettled nature of this question, a more detailed
look at the legal support behind each position is warranted.
C. Arguments Made For and Against Including Mitigating
Measures
Although outcomes differ, federal courts do appear to
agree on the proper questions to ask when deciding what role
mitigating measures should play when evaluating an
individual's level of disability. These questions include: 1) how
much deference should the EEOC's interpretive guidance be
given?; 2) should the legislative history of the ADA be consult-
ed in order to determine the validity of the EEOC's guidance?;
and 3) would implementing the EEOC's guidance on this issue
extend the protection of the ADA to a group of people Congress
did not intend the statute to protect? The following survey of
federal case law will concentrate on the reasoning provided for
each answer to these three central questions.
1. How Much Deference Should the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidance be Given?
The EEOC's position on mitigating measures is clearly
pronounced in their interpretive guidance.' 5 Since its posi-
tion is clear, courts must first determine how much weight and
deference the guidance should be given. Federal courts have
responded to this question in two ways. Some courts give the
EEOC's guidance considerable deference since it was promul-
:0 See id. at 768 (Guy, J., dissenting).
1 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 768 (Guy, J., dissenting).
104 See id.
1 See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h), (j) (1998).
113919981
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
gated by the administrative agency designated by Congress to
enforce and interpret Title I of the ADA and since it seems to
be consistent with the statute."°6 Other federal courts refuse
to defer to the guidance because they believe it directly contra-
dicts the plain, unambiguous language of the statute.0 7
The Supreme Court has held that the amount of deference
afforded an agency interpretation of a statute depends primari-
ly upon the type of regulation the agency issues and whether
the interpretation appears to be in agreement or in conflict
with the plain meaning of the statute.0 8 A very deferential
position is taken with respect to "legislative rules-agency
regulations which have been subject to "notice-and-comment"
procedures prior to their adoption.09 On the other hand, "in-
terpretive rules" promulgated by an administrative agency
which do not require notice-and-comment "do not have the
force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the
adjudicatory process.""0 Both the actual legislative rules pro-
mulgated by the EEOC to implement Title I and its interpre-
tive appendix at issue here were subjected to a public notice-
and-comment procedure."' This fact gives the EEOC's appen-
10 See, e.g., Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir.
1996); Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 904 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997); Sicard v. City
of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1435-37 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
"o See, e.g., Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107 (D.R.I.
1997); Sutton v. United Air Line, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997); Murphy
v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880 (D. Kan. 1996); Schluter v.
Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J.
Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
108 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 844 (1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be
accorded to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is
entrusted to administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpre-
tations . . ").
"09 See Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1433-34 (footnote omitted).
.. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995); see also
Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977) ("[A] court is not required to
give effect to an interpretive regulation."); Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98
F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996) ("An interpretive regulation ... is accorded less
deference" than a legislative regulation).
... See Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 8578 (1991) (to be codified 29 C.F.R. § 1630) (proposed Feb. 28, 1991); Equal
Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35726
(1991) (final rule to be codified in an appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630); see also Wil-
son, 964 F. Supp. 898 at 903 & n.4. But see Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of
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dix more weight than interpretive rules normally receive. How-
ever, "administrative constructions which are contrary to clear
congressional intent" must be rejected by the courts regardless
of their implementation procedures."' The central question,
therefore, is whether the EEOC's guidance, which mandates an
impairment be evaluated in its untreated state, is permissible
in light of the actual language of the ADA.
Courts which defer to the EEOC regarding mitigating
measures find nothing in the language of the statute, its legis-
lative history, or in other agency pronouncements which con-
flicts with or countermands the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADA.' These courts have held that the statute's plain mean-
ing supports an examination of an individual's untreated con-
dition". because Title I uses only the word "impairment"
when defining what is protected under the ADA, not "treated
impairment" or "impairment plus treatment.""5 Ignoring the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures does not, in the
opinion of the deferring courts, read the "substantially limits"
requirement out of the statue."6 On the contrary, the EEOC's
interpretive guidance only answers a question which the stat-
ute does not directly address-whether a substantial limitation
is to be evaluated with or without regard to mitigating mea-
sures."' The EEOC guidance, therefore, does not contradict
Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Because the EEOC's Interpretive
Guidelines are not . . .subject to the notice and comment procedure .. .they are
not entitled to [a] high degree of deference . . . .") (footnote omitted); Fallacaro,
965 F. Supp. at 93 (stating that the EEOC rule regarding no mitigating measures
was not subject to the notice and comment process).
1 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9; see also Public Employees Retirement Sys.
v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) ("[O]f course, no deference is due to agency
interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself.").
11 See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996)
("nothing in the language of the statute ... that rules out [the EEOC's] ap-
proach."); Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1436 ("The interpretive regulations here are also
entitled to deference when the court considers other factors, including the validity
of their reasoning, their consistency with earlier and later agency pronouncements,
and whether they were issued contemporaneously with the passage of the statute
being interpreted.") (footnote omitted).
.1. See Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1436 ("The EEOC's interpretive regulations sim-
ply reflect th[e] plain meaning of the word 'impairment.").
1 Id.
16 See id.
" See Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 904 (E.D.
Pa. 1997). At footnote six on the same page, Judge Rendell explains the statute's
ambiguity with a illustration:
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the statute's requirement that an impairment substantially
limit a major life activity. It simply clarifies the fact that the
ADA protects individuals who would suffer a substantial limi-
tation if their impairments were left untreated."'
Other federal courts, however, have refused to defer to the
EEOC's interpretation and believe its guidance is "at odds with
the plain language of the ADA.""9 These courts read the
words "impairment" and "substantially limits" to connote "the
requirement of a real and existing limitation as opposed to a
hypothetical one."'2° They cite the legislature's use of the
present tense in the phrase "substantially limits" to indicate
Congress' unambiguous intent that an individual's actual abili-
ty to perform a major life activity is to be evaluated, rather
than what a person may suffer without medication. 2' These
courts find it "difficult to see how a condition that has been
ameliorated so that it does not affect an individual's ability to
function normally can be construed as an 'impairment. '"" '22
Consider, for example, the analogous case of a patient with a leg injury
who requires the use of crutches to be able to walk properly. If this
patient's doctor were to ask him, "Are you able to walk down the street?"
one can certainly say that the doctor's question, that is, the meaning of
the words themselves, is quite. clear. However, one would still need to
inquire further to know whether the doctor intended for the patient to
answer the question with or without regard to his use of crutches. The
doctor's question, without more, does not inform the patient as to wheth-
er he is being asked whether he can walk down the street on his own
without crutches, or whether the doctor wishes to know if the crutches
are enabling him to walk down the street. The patient would simply
have to know more in order to accurately respond to the doctor's ques-
tion.
Id. at 904 n.6.
"' See Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1436.
.19 Sutton v. United Air Line, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997); see also
Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 963 F. Supp. 102, 107 (D.R.I 1997); Schluter
v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996) ('the EEOC's
interpretation is in direct conflict with the language of the statute that requires
plaintiffs .. .to show that an impairment 'substantially limits' their lives.").
120 Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 107.
121 See id.; Ellison v. Software Spectrum, 85 F.3d 187, 191-92 n.3 (5th Cir.
1996) ("[H]ad Congress intended that substantial limitation be determined without
regard to mitigating measures, it would have provided for coverage under
§ 12102(2)(A) for impairments that have the potential to substantially limit a ma-
jor life activity.").
2 Hodgens, 963 F. Supp. at 107.; see Schluter, 928 F. Supp. at 1445:
If an insulin-dependant diabetic can control her condition with the use of
insulin or a near-sighted person can correct her vision with eyeglasses or
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The EEOC's interpretation is seen as an attempt to "gloss"
over the statutory requirement of proving a substantially limit-
ing disability." As such, these courts maintain that EEOC
guidance should be disregarded as contrary to the language of
the statute.
These courts further support their position by pointing out
that the instruction to ignore mitigating measures conflicts not
only with the language of the statute, but also with later por-
tions of the same EEOC guidance." The EEOC uses the fol-
lowing example to illustrate a situation where an employee
would be protected by the ADA because he is "regarded as"
having a disability, even though his disability is not substan-
tially limiting: "For example, suppose an employee has con-
trolled high blood pressure that is not substantially limiting. If
an employer reassigns the individual to less strenuous work
because of unsubstantiated fears.., the employer would be
regarding the individual as disabled."" This example is read
by some courts as conflicting with the EEOC's earlier guidance
on actual disabilities, which requires an evaluation of substan-
tial limitations be made without regard to mitigating mea-
sures.
126
Under that mandate, the employee in the example would
not need to qualify for the ADA's protection through the "re-
garded as" category because his unmedicated high blood pres-
sure would be an actual disability. 27 Yet, according to the in-
terpretive guidance, the employee in the example is not actual-
ly disabled, because his "controlled high blood pressure does
not affect, in fact, the ability to perform a major life activi-
ty.," 28 This employee can only qualify for the protection of the
contact lenses, she cannot argue that her life is substantially limited by
her condition. To say that a person who needs insulin or eyeglasses is
disabled in fact is to read out of the act's first definition of a disability
the requirement that it applies only to those persons who are 'substan-
tially limited' in major life activities.
(citation omitted).
12 See Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
12 See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902; see also Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
946 F. Supp. 872, 880 (D. Kan. 1996).
'2 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C) (1996).
126 See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902; see also Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880.
2 See Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880.
1 Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902.
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ADA if he is "regarded as" being disabled. The courts refusing
to follow the EEOC guidance regarding mitigating measures
read this internal tension as "implicitly suggest[ing] that a per-
son who has controlled his blood pressure by medication does
not have a[n] [actual] disability."129
2. Should the Legislative History of the ADA be
Consulted?
Under traditional cannons of statutory interpretation,
courts are to consider a statute's legislative history only when
the language of the statute is ambiguous."' Courts which
disregard EEOC guidance on mitigating measures label con-
gressional intent inapplicable, as, they assert, the guidance is
in direct conflict with the language of the statute. 3' Since
the statutory phrase "substantially limits" is seen as unambig-
uous and clearly requires the evaluation of an impairment to
take mitigating measures into account, 3 2 these courts refuse
to defer to EEOC guidance, declaring it invalid without any
further inquiry into congressional intent. "To paraphrase Jus-
tice Holmes' oft-quoted statement, [these courts] do not inquire
what Congress meant; [they] only ask what it said."33
On the other hand, courts which do give substantial defer-
ence to the EEOC's guidance regard the ADA's legislative his-
tory as both applicable and convincing. These courts find the
words of Title I ambiguous with regard to mitigating mea-
1 Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 880 (emphasis added). But see Gilday v. Mecosta
County, 124 F.3d 760, 763 n.1 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The fallacy of this argument is
that it assumes that all uncontrolled high blood pressure is substantially limiting
per se . . ").
"0 See Public Employees Retirement Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 185
(1989); Sicard v. City of Sioux City, 950 F. Supp. 1420, 1437 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
(citing Davis v. Michigan Dep't- of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 808 n.3 (1989) (quote
omitted)).
131 See Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Tex. 1994) ("If
the statutory language at issue, here the word 'limits' is not ambiguous, legislative
history and congressional intent are inapplicable to the analysis . . . ."). But see
Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dept., 964 F. Supp. 898, 905 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
("IThe legislative history of the ADA also represents another aid in this Court's
statutory interpretation.").
See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
' Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819, 824 n.11 (5th Cir. 1993).
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sures.'34 This statutory ambiguity justifies giving deference to
the EEOC's interpretation, so long as its interpretation is not
contradicted by the statute's legislative history."5 Far from
contradicting congressional intent, the deferring courts claim
the EEOC's guidance on mitigating measures "directly mim-
ic[s]" the language of the congressional record. 3 ' The legisla-
tive history of the ADA strengthens these courts' reliance on
the EEOC's guidance, since the congressional record can be
read to require that impairments be evaluated without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures.3 7
3. Does the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance Expand the
Scope of the ADA Beyond What Congress Intended?
The policy-based argument made by most courts which
examine the issue of mitigating measures, combines the statu-
tory interpretation and congressional intent arguments. Courts
that refuse to follow the EEOC's guidance anchor their policy
argument to one basic proposition: protecting individuals who
have impairments controlled by medication is "an expansion of
disability protection beyond the logical scope of the ADA." 38
See text accompanying supra notes 113-18.
13 See, e.g., Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1438 (using the legislative history to evalu-
ate the validity of the agency's interpretation of the statute); Wilson, 964 F. Supp.
at 904-05 (using the legislative history to support the agency's interpretation of
the unclear statutory language).
136 Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1437; see also Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of
Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 467-68 (5th Cir. 1998) (using the ADA's legislative his-
tory to support the EEOC's interpretive guidance). Compare 29 C.F.R. app.
§ 1630.2(j) (1998) ("The determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devic-
es."), with S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22 (1989) ("Moreover, whether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating mea-
sures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."), and, H.R. REP. No.
101-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990) ("Whether a person has a disability should be as-
sessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reason-
able accommodations or auxiliary aids . . . [Plersons with impairments . . . which
substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first prong of the
definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication.").
'" See Sicard, 950 F. Supp. at 1438 ("[Tlhe court finds that the agency's reli-
ance on clear congressional statements in the legislative history to be a sound
basis for the agency's interpretation.").
13 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., Civ.A.No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, *5 (D.
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The discomfort these courts have with strict adherence to the
EEOC's interpretive guidance is exemplified by considering the
result of applying the agency's interpretation to an impairment
like correctable myopia.1
39
"Seeing" is a major life activity under Title I of the
ADA. " Myopia is an impairment that substantially limits
the major life activity of seeing for many Americans. Myopia is
correctable, however, to 20/20 vision or better if mitigating
measures such as eyeglasses or contact lenses are used.14
Allowing uncorrected sight to be evaluated in a "substantially
limits" test would expand the ADA's coverage to "[m]illions of
Americans" who would then qualify as protected individuals;
this would, in effect, render "the term disabled... a meaning-
less phrase."' "[Ihf the statutory protections available to
those truly handicapped could be claimed by anyone whose
disability was minor and whose relative severity of impairment
was widely shared," the "high purpose" of the ADA would be
debased.4 3 If individuals with correctable conditions like
myopia, high blood pressure, or insulin-controlled diabetes
keep their impairments in check with medication or assistive
devices, and if they function in their daily life activities the
same way unimpaired individuals do, these courts see no justi-
fication in extending the special protections of the ADA and
distorting the class of people Congress intended to protect.'"
Courts which enforce the EEOC's guidance on mitigating
measures, however, find that both the law and common sense
justify including people with corrected impairments within the
scope of the ADA. 1 5 These courts find it inherently unfair to
refuse to protect individuals with impairments just because
their prosthetic devices, medications or treatments are effec-
Colo. 1996).
... See Sutton v. United Air Line, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
140 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1998).
141 See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 902-03; Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F.
Supp. 1437, 1445 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
142 Sutton, Civ.A.No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, *1.
1 Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934 (4th Cir. 1986).
141 See id.; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 880-81 (D.
Kan. 1996); Coghlan v. H.J. Heinz Co., 851 F. Supp. 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 1994).
145 See Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.D.C. 1997); Krocka v.
Reigler, 958 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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rive. 46 Simply because an individual can take medication or
don eyewear to reduce or temporarily eliminate the effect of an
impairment "does not eliminate the underlying disability" and
should not preclude that individual from ADA protection."
The courts which defer to the EEOC's guidance do not believe
the ADA's shield will be hyperextended by protecting these
individuals. On the contrary, these courts remain convinced
that "[i]ndividuals who need ... prosthetic devices [or other
forms of mitigating measures] clearly have impairments that
may substantially limit their major life activities"'48 and that
they are precisely the individuals the ADA was intended to
protect.
III. A SUGGESTED RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT OVER THE
EEOC's INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE
Although most appellate courts have found in favor of
strict adherence to the EEOC guidelines on the issue of miti-
gating measures, 1 the judiciary's discomfort with completely
ignoring the ameliorative effects of medication and other devic-
es remains. 5 ' Because, in the past, this topic has forced a
choice between two extremes-fully accepting the EEOC's inter-
pretive guidance or ignoring both the guidance and the
individual's untreated disability-the most durable and reason-
able position may be at the center of these two outer-
reaches. 5' Giving deference to the EEOC's guidance by con-
146 See Fallacaro, 965 F. Supp. at 93.
147 Id.
18 Id.
" See supra note 80.
150 See, e.g., Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766-68 (6th Cir. 1997)
(Kennedy, J. and Guy, J. delivering separate opinions regarding a mitigating mea-
sures evaluation); Smith v. Horton Indus., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1099 (D.S.D.
1998); Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
... One very recent attempt to find "a happy medium" solution to this issue
was advanced by the Fifth Circuit in Washington v. HCA Health Serv. of Texas,
Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998). The opinion held that only those im-
pairments which are "serious in the common parlance and . . . require that the
individual use mitigating measures on a frequent basis" will be evaluated "in their
unmitigated state." Id. Those ameliorations that "amount to permanent corrections"
will be factored into a "substantially limits" evaluation. Id. While this type of
reasoning is a start, it doesn't seem to go far enough in preventing the overexten-
sion of ADA protection.
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sidering an individual's untreated impairment should be bal-
anced against the other factors which determine a person's
substantial limitation.'52 "In some cases a person with a
'controlled' medical problem or condition will be completely
functional and should be evaluated as such. In other cases, a
person with a controlled medical condition may still be under a
disability... ."3 Under this tempered approach, the evalua-
tion of an individual's untreated impairment is part of a "sub-
stantially limits" test, but it is not the only factor taken into
consideration.
This case-by-case analysis finds support in the EEOC's
regulations. Section 1630.2(j) of the regulations provides that
three factors are to be considered when deciding if an impair-
ment is substantially limiting: "(i) [tihe nature and severity of
the impairment; (ii) [tihe duration or expected duration of the
impairment; and (iii) [tihe permanent or long term impact, or
the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting
from the impairment."154 This section later defines "substan-
tially limits" as meaning "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can
perform a particular major life activity as compared to the
condition, manner or duration under which the average person
in the general population can perform that same major life
activity."15
5
Since the mere presence of mitigating measures does not
automatically prove an individual has a qualified disabili-
ty, '5 combining an examination of an untreated impairment
with an examination of the other factors listed under section
1630.2(j)'s "substantially limits" test ensures a full statutory
analysis. The presence of a severe, untreated condition alone
will not guarantee an individual will be found substantially
limited, especially if that individual "is able to perform activi-
ties [on a daily basis] at the same level as a person in the
... See infra text accompanying notes 154-55.
'- Gilday, 124 F.3d at 768 (Guy, J., concurring); see also Hendler, 963 F. Supp.
at 207.
154 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (1998).
15 Id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
156 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNrY COMM'N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL,
VOL. 2, EEOC Order 915.002, § 902.6 at 902-37 (Mar. 14, 1995).
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general population."'57 Likewise, an individual who suffers
from a severe untreated impairment and otherwise qualifies as
substantially limited will not be denied protection just because
treatment ameliorates her daily condition.'58
This comprehensive approach is further supported by the
congressional record charting the development of the ADA. The
exact language used by both the House and Senate to address
the issue of mitigating measures varies slightly from the lan-
guage used by the EEOC in their interpretive guidance.'59
The last sentence in the section of Congress' report addressing
actual disabilities reads: "Whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of miti-
gating measures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxil-
iary aids. "1" In the sentences preceding this quote, Congress
emphasized that, in order for an impairment to rise to the
level of a disability, the impairment must be severe in fact.''
Mandating that the "availability of mitigating measures"
should be ignored further emphasizes the importance of consid-
ering only the actual effects of an individual's impairment.
Using the phrase availability of is also evidence that Congress'
priority was an evaluation of a person's genuine limitations,
not how the condition might be improved nor how it may wors-
en.
62
The EEOC announcement containing its final rules on
section 1630 also used the phrase "availability of mitigating
measures,"63 although the first two words were lost when
these rules were codified in the actual appendix." In their
Hendler, 963 F. Supp. at 206.
5 See id.
9 Compare congressional language, supra note 136, with EEOC language, infra
note 164.
160 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 52 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23
(1990) (emphasis added).
161 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at 50-52; S. REP. No. 101-116, at 21-23.
12 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 11, at 50-52; S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 21-23..
Although the House Report does provide two examples of application of the miti-
gating measures rule which closely mirror the examples contained in the EEOC's
guidance, the clear emphasis of the section as a whole remains on the real condi-
tion of the individual with an impairment. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. II, at
52.
163 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35726, 35727 (1991) (final rule to be codified in an appendix to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630) (emphasis added).
'" See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1998) ('The existence of an impairment is to
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overview of the regulations, the EEOC summed up its central
interpretive approach to the statute: "Of necessity, many of the
determinations that may be required by this part must be
made on a case-by-case basis."'65 Then, in the section devoted
exclusively to a discussion of the phrase "substantially limits,"
the EEOC explained that it revised section 1630.2(j)'s interpre-
tive guidance to "make it clear that the determination of
whether an impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities is to be made without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures."'66 The EEOC further explained that it
amended the guidance to underscore the importance of "fo-
cus[ing] on the individual's capacity to perform major life activ-
ities rather than on the presence or absence of mitigating mea-
sures."'67 "Substantially limits," as defined here by the
EEOC, mandates a "real life" evaluation of a person's impair-
ment which certainly would include examining the effect miti-
gating measures actually have on the person's impairment.
The reasonableness of this case-specific approach is best
exemplified by applying it to a hypothetical scenario involving
mitigating measures. Consider, for example, two plaintiffs with
asthma, both seeking accommodations in their work environ-
ment through Title I of the ADA."68 Plaintiff A has been
treated for asthma since the age of 5; he has episodes of severe
wheezing, shortness of breath and coughing, which on four
occasions necessitated emergency medical care; he must use a
multi-drug regimen to treat his condition. Plaintiff B's asthma
began as an adult, caused by an allergic reaction to her house
cats. It triggers wheezing, coughing, headaches and tightness
be determined without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or
assistive or prosthetic devices."); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(j) ("The determination of
whether an individual is substantially limited ... must be made ... without
regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic devic-
es.").
"6 Equal Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed.
Reg. 35726, 35726 (1991) (final rule to be codified in an appendix to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630).
166 Id. at 35727 (emphasis added).
117 Id. at 35728.
*" These hypothetical cases are based loosely on the facts of Heilweil v. Mount
Sinai Hosp., 32 F.3d 718 (2d Cir. 1994) (granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment against plaintiff with asthma), and Hendler v. Intelecom USA, Inc., 963
F. Supp. 200 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment
against plaintiff with asthma).
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in her chest, particularly when she is exposed to forced air
systems in rooms without windows; her condition is treated
with exercise and other lifestyle changes. Both plaintiffs state
they are able to exercise regularly without significant restric-
tion and otherwise lead "normal" lives.
A strict application of the EEOC's guidance on mitigating
measures would likely qualify both plaintiffs under the ADA,
since, on the facts above, their untreated asthmatic conditions
seem to substantially limit the major life activity of breathing.
On the other hand, evaluating the plaintiffs' treated impair-
ments would probably preclude both of them from asserting
the protection of the ADA, since medication and other forms of
treatment control their asthma and allow them to live "nor'-
mal" lives. To achieve a result more satisfactory than simply
both or neither, a broader evaluation of whether asthma sub-
stantially limits the plaintiffs' lives is necessary.'
A comprehensive "substantially limits" analysis would con-
sider the severity, duration and long-term impact of each
plaintiffs asthma,7 ' as well as its treated and untreated
state. Each plaintiffs overall ability to breathe would also be
compared with an average person's ability to breathe.' Un-
der this case-specific analysis, Plaintiff A would likely be found
to qualify under the ADA as an individual substantially limit-
ed by his asthma in the major life activity of breathing, while
Plaintiff B would not. Even though both plaintiffs' treated
conditions were similar, the duration, severity and long-term
impact of Plaintiff B's asthma is significantly less than that of
Plaintiff A. In addition, while it is common for people in the
general population to experience allergic reactions to cats or
experience physical discomfort when deprived of freshly circu-
lated air, it is not common for members of the general popula-
tion to be hospitalized for breathing problems or require medi-
cation to breathe normally. Although both plaintiffs suffer from
the same impairment, which is improved to the same level by
corrective measures, the severity of the impairments varies,
causing one to be substantially limiting under the ADA and
the other not. This evaluative process combines deference to
" See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
170 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2G)(2) (1998).
1 See id. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
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the EEOC with adherence to congressional intent and the
overarching purposes of the ADA to reach a more equitable
outcome. 172
CONCLUSION
Although uncertainty is an inherent drawback in any case-
specific analysis, the flexibility provided is a benefit well-worth
the doubt. This approach combines the strongest legal argu-
ments on both sides of the issue of mitigating measures, giving
the EEOC's guidance deference, while preserving the ADA's re-
quirement that an impairment substantially limit an
individual's life activities. Weighing the importance of an
individual's treated and untreated condition ensures that the
protective covering of the ADA is not stretched so thin it be-
gins to wear and develop gaps where protection should have
been provided. Similarly, under this approach, the ADA does
not become so narrow that the people it was intended to pro-
tect are left vulnerable to the discrimination the ADA was
meant to destroy.
Elizabeth A Chang
172 But see Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice:
How Individualizing the Determination of 'Disability" Undermines the ADA, 42
VILL. L. REV. 327, 338-40 (1997) (criticizing courts which make individual disabili-
ty determinations).
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